copy yourself ?

John W. Sarkela sarkela at sbcglobal.net
Tue May 27 19:28:54 UTC 2003


On Tuesday, May 27, 2003, at 06:37 AM, jan ziak wrote:
>
> i think of objects as NOT having common sense. i think, we can get a 
> copy of
> an object A only if there is someone who knows how to make a new object
> looking like A. the one who knows how to copy an object is a 
> replicator. but
> my opinion is to think in terms that replicator cannot replicate
> itself...there must be "something" replicating it.
>
> you said that you like objects which can do basic things for 
> themselves. my
> opinion is that no object exists "on its own" but is surrounded by an
> environment. i do not think that objects have something like "self" but
> rather that we attribute "self" to them.

To quote Dan Ingalls in "Design Principles Behind Smalltalk", BYTE 
Magazine, August 1981

> Communicating Objects
>     The mind observes a vast universe of experience, both immediate 
> and recorded. One can derive a sense of oneness with the universe 
> simply by letting this experience be, just as it is. However, if one 
> wishes to participate, literally to take a part, in the universe, one 
> must draw distinctions. In so doing one identifies an object in the 
> universe, and simultaneously all the rest becomes not-that-object. 
> Distinction by itself is a start, but the process of distinguishing 
> does not get any easier. Every time you want to talk about "that chair 
> over there", you must repeat the entire processes of distinguishing 
> that chair. This is where the act of reference comes in: we can 
> associate a unique identifier with an object, and, from that time on, 
> only the mention of that identifier is necessary to refer to the 
> original object.
>     We have said that a computer system should provide models that are 
> compatible with those in the mind. Therefore:
>
> Objects: A computer language should support the concept of "object" 
> and provide a uniform means for referring to the objects in its 
> universe.

Thus, the notion of "self" is precisely a consequence of the act of 
distinction and the basis of identity. As a locus of control and 
observation, I (the self) stand apart from the rest of the frame in 
which I am embedded. This is the operational definition of "self" 
within the design of Smalltalk and in occurrence, within the Smalltalk 
image. Thus, all objects that are to be the recipients of messages 
should support the behavior of those things that can be uniquely 
distinguished, the class of Objects.

Communication is not possible in the absence of distinct and 
distinguishable endpoints for that communication. Smalltalk at its core 
is not object oriented, but rather, communication oriented.
(Consider that I can substitute a framework of cooperating objects for 
a singleton instance if their behaviors are the same. This implies that 
it is the patterns of communication that are important in Smalltalk, 
not the objects themselves.)

Further, the notion that "names" may be associated with distinguishable 
loci of behavior leads to our ability to perceive objects in the first 
place. The act of producing a sign to stand as a reference leads to our 
perception of an object. Now we are treading into the realm of 
semiotics... my studies suggest that objective reality can only be 
expressed in a language of description (where by language of 
description, I am including all forms and expression of sign production 
and signification).

Physics backs this up, when it was discovered that a sensor can only 
detect changes in itself. This implies that when I touch a cup, I don't 
feel the cup, my finger feels pressure which I perceive as "touching" 
the cup. That when I look at a cup, there is no direct connection 
between my self and the observed cup, rather that patterns of changes 
in my retina which I presume to be the consequence of patterns of 
photons that have previously interacted with a cup on their way to my 
retina are perceived by me as "seeing" the cup. To reiterate, my only 
access to reality, is through a language of description.

My conclusions?
1. selfhood is a consequence of the distinctions that distinguish one 
loci of behavior from another.
2. the act of producing a reference to a distinct loci of behavior 
leads to the perception of objects.
3. communication is the expression of intents between objects.
4. the object identified by a reference, may itself be a very 
structured and behavior full entity capable of many things within the 
bounds of the distinction of self. Thus, we use the terms reflection 
and introspection to describe communication with self.
5. objective reality is a semiotic process... is a photon event a wave 
or a particle? I suppose it depends upon the language of description 
one uses in understanding photon events.

:-}> John Sarkela, Sir CurlyBraceFace Knight of the Square Bracket [|]

PS "The Laws of Form" is a *great* read. Sort of an ontological 
approach to mathematics. Things get particularly interesting when 
sufficient machinery is built up such that the form may reenter the 
form...


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