[squeak-dev] [UPD] NativeBoost runs on new Cog VMs
siguctua at gmail.com
Mon Mar 21 13:09:05 UTC 2011
On 21 March 2011 13:03, Bert Freudenberg <bert at freudenbergs.de> wrote:
> On 21.03.2011, at 12:42, Igor Stasenko wrote:
>> On 21 March 2011 11:54, Bert Freudenberg <bert at freudenbergs.de> wrote:
>>> On 21.03.2011, at 03:12, Igor Stasenko wrote:
>>>> On 21 March 2011 02:43, Levente Uzonyi <leves at elte.hu> wrote:
>>>>> On Sun, 20 Mar 2011, Igor Stasenko wrote:
>>>>>> i just wanna to inform you that i adopted NativeBoost plugin for
>>>>>> building with latest Cog vms.
>>>>>> To build VM, you should have an image with VMMaker + CMakeVMMaker
>>>>>> packages installed.
>>>>>> Then load NBIntaller package and do:
>>>>>> NBInstaller installCogPlugin
>>>>>> There are new cmake configurations i added to build VMs with NB plugin
>>>>> It's an old question, but I don't remember your answer, so: wouldn't it
>>>>> be better to add a command line switch for enabling NB? So even if a VM is
>>>>> compiled with NB, I can still turn it off if I want to.
>>>> It is disabled by default, when you starting a new image.
>>>> This allows me to not care if some of the methods were carrying native
>>>> code saved into an image.
>>>> For enabling a native code, one should invoke #primitiveEnable first.
>>>> You can customize a mechanism of enabling it in
>>>> NativeBoost class>>enableNativeCode
>>>> and put checking of command-line argument(s) there.
>>>> And yes, i am against putting extra logic at plugin side :)
>>>> The reason is simple: if you using it, then you know what you doing,
>>>> and if you don't - then you safe anyways.
>>> IMHO it's a good idea to not allow native code execution if the VM sandbox is enabled. Just like e.g. OSProcess checks the SecurityPlugin for this.
>> Bert, but you cannot state that your deployment are more secure just
>> because you are passing "right" command-line arguments to VM.
> I didn't say anything about command line arguments.
>> As i said before , if you want security for real, then you should
>> build own "sandboxed" version of VM, which simply having no way to use
>> such features.
> I disagree. There should be a single version of the VM that can be used in almost all circumstances. E.g. there should be a single Linux package for the VM. Possibly three for interpreter/stack/cog, but it makes no sense at all to have more than one interpreter, IMHO.
It sounds as contradiction to me. From one side you want to make VM
being responsible for certain level of security, but from another
side, you want it to be open for "insecure" stuff like NativeBoost.
Apparently you can't have both at once. You should choose one.
Unless you change VM to disable external module loading mechanism,
there is no any security guarantees, only imaginable ones.
I could download plugin from web, place it into 'secure' directory and
then tell VM to load it as external plugin. And where is your
command-line option(s) now?
For things like NativeBoost, it is responsibility of developer(s) ,
what level of security is desirable/enough for them.
In this regard, VM is just a tool which developers using.
And may i ask, why you don't want to put a security measures at
language side? You can disable or completely remove compiler. You can
disable a primitives which allow doing "nasty" stuff,
and of course you can make it controllable from command line. And
because it is at language side, it is much easier to maintain and fix
and develop in general. So, why not?
I am really enjoying that smalltalk has a wide open architecture, but
at the same time it missing one simple thing: a 'deployment' mode,
where you have certain security guarantees out of the box.
So that's an open question, why we never had that in Squeak.. VM
cannot do such magic, it is too stupid and cannot really tell if given
sequence of bytecodes/class format/external plugin are secure enough
This logic is best to be put at image side where you can reason about
it much easier because you have reflection ( and smalltalk instead of
> It would be a shame if e.g. Etoys would have to ship its own VM because you made it less secure in newer versions. After all, it was Etoys that convinced all the major Linux distros to even include a VM.
No no no.. Please stop looking at VM as a black-box with two inputs
and one TV output. This approach is too naive and will never pass any
real-world testing, moreover it hinders any progress towards improving
state of art.
If you approach with our "standard" VM to some serious guys, first
thing they will do is to ask a security expert to evaluate it..
And then any your proposal which is based on such technology will be
rejected instantly, and i fear that project budget will be spent on
making same thing but in java.
So, it is a shame that we don't have a good answer to tough guys, and
instead of really looking how to make system sound and secure, we're
like sitting ducks with all these command-line options, which can be
some clever guy in few minutes.
In my vision, VM should be made a dynamically loadable library with
nice API to interact with host application. Currently we have a
monolithic VM, which is host and library in one. But in future i'd
like (and not just me btw) to have
VM which can be easily embedded into a host application, and then host
application can control security as well as many other aspects.
For things like browser plugin, you simply can't use same things for
everything. And so, we should provide a way for making it easy to
customize VM for own purpose(s),
but at same time make it flexible enough to make forking pointless.
And that's exactly why we building an infrastructure for VMs: it will
enable us to build own custom VMs in much easier, much less painful
and much more controllable way.
And for Etoys this is a way to go: you can share the same code base,
but in own corner you could have mods, which will disable or stub-out
In that way you can be confident that application you distributing is secure,
and instead of arguing with me (or some other VM developer guy) what
is best for you, you can do it yourself without much stress. :)
Just don't tell me that you don't want this, or you never considered
it as a good perspective. ( I won't believe you anyways ;)
>> Otherwise that's just a painting on the water pool.
> I don't quite get that analogy ;)
Standing on the bank of river and trying to paint on water stream.
> And we're not after absolute security, which can't be achieved anyway. But why taking a step back from where we are already?
> - Bert -
Igor Stasenko AKA sig.
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