For each of the following applications of hash functions, explain which of hash function properties (preimage resistant, second preimage resistant and collision resistant) are needed and which are not.
(a) Cryptographic signatures are produced by computing a hash of a message, then applying a signature function to the hash of the message. Suppose Eve has a list of messages m1,...mn, and their signatures computed using Bob's signing key, but does not have Bob's signing key. Assuming that the signature function is not susceptible to attack, it should not be possible for Eve to present Bob's signature on any message other than m1,...mn.
(b) Suppose that Eve works for a Certificate Authority. She does not have access to the special harware that computes digital signatures, but she knows the hash function. In addition, Eve can get messages signed, but every message that is signed automatically goes into a log file that Eve cannot change. Eve should not be able to produce a certificate signed by the Certificate Authority that does not appear in the log file.
Anybody can explain these to me?
thanks Akhil [image: Reply With Quote]http://www.unix.com/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=302072426
Hi Scal,
Can you give us some background of what you are doing? Is this a school assignment?
If it is then maybe you could give us an idea of what you do understand and what you do not, so that we can help either with a discussion or suggestions for other reference material.
Ron Teitelbaum
_____
From: cryptography-bounces@lists.squeakfoundation.org [mailto:cryptography-bounces@lists.squeakfoundation.org] On Behalf Of scal rahotguy Sent: Tuesday, May 02, 2006 11:17 PM To: Cryptography@lists.squeakfoundation.org Subject: [Cryptography Team] Hash function properties
For each of the following applications of hash functions, explain which of hash function properties (preimage resistant, second preimage resistant and collision resistant) are needed and which are not.
(a) Cryptographic signatures are produced by computing a hash of a message, then applying a signature function to the hash of the message. Suppose Eve has a list of messages m1,...mn, and their signatures computed using Bob's signing key, but does not have Bob's signing key. Assuming that the signature function is not susceptible to attack, it should not be possible for Eve to present Bob's signature on any message other than m1,...mn.
(b) Suppose that Eve works for a Certificate Authority. She does not have access to the special harware that computes digital signatures, but she knows the hash function. In addition, Eve can get messages signed, but every message that is signed automatically goes into a log file that Eve cannot change. Eve should not be able to produce a certificate signed by the Certificate Authority that does not appear in the log file.
Anybody can explain these to me?
thanks Akhil
http://www.unix.com/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=302072426 Reply With Quote
On 5/3/06, Ron Teitelbaum Ron@usmedrec.com wrote:
Hi Scal,
Can you give us some background of what you are doing? Is this a school assignment?
yes. it is.
If it is then maybe you could give us an idea of what you do understand
and what you do not, so that we can help either with a discussion or suggestions for other reference material.
yes. certainly for example in (b). I do not think I understood the question. Eve knows the hash function and I also assumed she also knows the private key of Bob. How can anybody knows once she sends a message with Bob's signature? How can hash funtion's property help here? Can somebody throw light here?
thanks Akhil
Ron Teitelbaum
*From:* cryptography-bounces@lists.squeakfoundation.org [mailto: cryptography-bounces@lists.squeakfoundation.org] *On Behalf Of *scal rahotguy *Sent:* Tuesday, May 02, 2006 11:17 PM *To:* Cryptography@lists.squeakfoundation.org *Subject:* [Cryptography Team] Hash function properties
For each of the following applications of hash functions, explain which of hash function properties (preimage resistant, second preimage resistant and collision resistant) are needed and which are not.
(a) Cryptographic signatures are produced by computing a hash of a message, then applying a signature function to the hash of the message. Suppose Eve has a list of messages m1,...mn, and their signatures computed using Bob's signing key, but does not have Bob's signing key. Assuming that the signature function is not susceptible to attack, it should not be possible for Eve to present Bob's signature on any message other than m1,...mn.
(b) Suppose that Eve works for a Certificate Authority. She does not have access to the special harware that computes digital signatures, but she knows the hash function. In addition, Eve can get messages signed, but every message that is signed automatically goes into a log file that Eve cannot change. Eve should not be able to produce a certificate signed by the Certificate Authority that does not appear in the log file.
Anybody can explain these to me?
thanks Akhil
[image: Reply With Quote]http://www.unix.com/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=302072426
Cryptography mailing list Cryptography@lists.squeakfoundation.org http://lists.squeakfoundation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Akhil,
For clarification of questions it is best that you ask your teacher, any help we could give you would be speculation on our part not having access to your learning materials, your teacher, or the context in which this was taught. If you have specific questions about the theory of cryptography please let us know.
Ron
_____
From: scal rahotguy [mailto:scalrahotguy@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 03, 2006 1:17 PM To: Ron@usmedrec.com; Cryptography Team Development List Subject: Re: [Cryptography Team] Hash function properties
On 5/3/06, Ron Teitelbaum Ron@usmedrec.com wrote:
Hi Scal,
Can you give us some background of what you are doing? Is this a school assignment?
yes. it is.
If it is then maybe you could give us an idea of what you do understand and what you do not, so that we can help either with a discussion or suggestions for other reference material.
yes. certainly for example in (b). I do not think I understood the question. Eve knows the hash function and I also assumed she also knows the private key of Bob. How can anybody knows once she sends a message with Bob's signature? How can hash funtion's property help here? Can somebody throw light here?
thanks
Akhil
Ron Teitelbaum
_____
From: cryptography-bounces@lists.squeakfoundation.org [mailto:cryptography-bounces@lists.squeakfoundation.org mailto:cryptography-bounces@lists.squeakfoundation.org ] On Behalf Of scal rahotguy Sent: Tuesday, May 02, 2006 11:17 PM To: Cryptography@lists.squeakfoundation.org Subject: [Cryptography Team] Hash function properties
For each of the following applications of hash functions, explain which of hash function properties (preimage resistant, second preimage resistant and collision resistant) are needed and which are not.
(a) Cryptographic signatures are produced by computing a hash of a message, then applying a signature function to the hash of the message. Suppose Eve has a list of messages m1,...mn, and their signatures computed using Bob's signing key, but does not have Bob's signing key. Assuming that the signature function is not susceptible to attack, it should not be possible for Eve to present Bob's signature on any message other than m1,...mn.
(b) Suppose that Eve works for a Certificate Authority. She does not have access to the special harware that computes digital signatures, but she knows the hash function. In addition, Eve can get messages signed, but every message that is signed automatically goes into a log file that Eve cannot change. Eve should not be able to produce a certificate signed by the Certificate Authority that does not appear in the log file.
Anybody can explain these to me?
thanks Akhil
http://www.unix.com/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=302072426 Reply With Quote
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