[Cryptography Team] Re: [Newbies] [ANN] Squeak CryptographyCertification Validation Officer

Ron Teitelbaum Ron at USMedRec.com
Wed Oct 11 23:53:41 UTC 2006


Hi Kyle, 

I discussed this with the certification lab that I spoke too.  It is a very
interesting question and one that we will need to address when it is time to
do the actual certification.  I know that the common criteria is less
strict, and that is where we are focusing now.  There are a number of ways
that we can ensure that the code is not modifiable, including coding signing
the VM, removing the compiler, crc checking the code before it runs, etc.  I
agree with you that this is going to be an interesting challenge, and it
will be expensive process once we get to the point when we think we are
secure the code and the VM and can pass the CC.  But I also feel that having
the certification would be a very good thing for Open Source in general, so
it's a path worth going down.  The lab thought that it would be difficult
also but they believed it was possible.  I planned to discuss this with the
lab that worked with OpenSSL but after realizing how much work there was
left to do before working with a lab, I figured it could wait.  If they
succeed then it makes it easier for us.

One of the tenants I've been working under is Good Enough Security.  The
idea is that if we try to build the perfect system we would find it a task
that is so daunting that we would never try.  If we try to make incremental
improvements using the best information that we can find, working with the
best possible people, and going through some of the certification processes,
even if we don't succeed, we make Squeak better, and more secure, and more
likely that businesses and developers will comfortably adopt Squeak.

My understanding of OpenSSL was that they had their certification but it was
pulled, they are working to restore that certification now, and they have
passed the lab stage and are waiting again for the government.  

One of the other things to consider that I have mentioned already is that
Microsoft CryptoAPI is FIPS certified.  It is possible that we could attach
to that and develop Squeak systems that are also certified, but I haven't
read through the security policy document thoroughly enough to know how
difficult that would be.

What other package where you thinking of?

Hope that helps!

Ron Teitelbaum
Squeak Cryptography Team Leader

> From: Kyle Hamilton
> Sent: Wednesday, October 11, 2006 6:05 PM
> 
> Welcome, Krishna!
> 
> In the grand scheme of things, how can the integrity of the
> cryptographic component module be verifiably maintained in Squeak?
> Because of the NIST/FIPS requirement of a security boundary, the
> implementation must be an immutable "black box" -- put data in, get
> data out.
> 
> OpenSSL has a FIPS-validated component (no longer available for
> obtainment, but people who obtained it before it was made
> no-longer-available) that would operate in the context of an extension
> to the interpreter.  [They're working on a follow-up validation for a
> to-be-made-available version of the library.]  There is also at least
> one FIPS-validated, freely-available module available for Windows
> other than OpenSSL.
> 
> I bring this up only because I can't see how such a black box could be
> created (and its internal state verifiable at all times) unless it's
> not written within the Squeak environment itself.  There isn't any
> means that I know of "sealing" classes and preventing data from being
> examined -- thus there isn't any means of enforcing a "black box"
> boundary the way that FIPS requires.
> 
> Any thoughts on the matter?  Anyone?
> 
> -Kyle H
> 
> On 10/11/06, Ron Teitelbaum <Ron at usmedrec.com> wrote:
> >
> > Krishna Sankar is joining our team as the new Squeak Cryptography
> > Certification Validation Officer.
> >
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