> I have two concerns.
> (1) The chilling effect of US legislation on other countries.
>     It has already been pointed out in comp.risks that some people in 
> other
>     countries are afraid of what might happen if they work on crypto 
> and then
>     visit the USA, thanks to the DCMA.

Imagine how we U.S. nationals must feel!  Agreed that the 
extraterritorial reaching is outrageous and dangerous.  Alas, it will be 
a few months before folks will again be able to focus on this sort of 
thing -- but it is an issue on which our neighbors should beat up upon 
us.

> (2) Last week's *outrage* is bound to create new pressure from US 
> intelligence
>     agencies for more power to intercept electronic communication.  The
>     general public, feeling themselves to be in a war, will quite 
> naturally
>     value security over privacy, so I expect opposition to be muted.  
> This
>     suggests that the outcome will be that SSSCA will require security
>     features, but that national security requirements will ensure that 
> they
>     are insecure.

SSSCA is simply stupid, bad, public policy -- a sop to the studios with 
no countervailing benefit, and it will cost the US electronics industry 
dearly if permitted to pass.  Happily, it has received lukewarm interest 
at present outside its advocates.  Time will tell.  I know that groups 
like IEEE are working on strong opposing position statements as we speak.

I am now deeply concerned about more invidious privacy concerns than 
SSSCA, which is primarily a means for enforcing hardware copy 
protection.  Far more invidious to me are the revived interest in 
enforced clipper-like backdoors as a precondition for using or selling 
encryption technology.  The matter is presently before the Senate, and 
may well get swept under the "wave" of anti-terrorism measures.  See, 
.e.g., Sen. Gregg's return to insanity:

	http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46816,00.html