[Cryptography Team] OpenSSL FIPS Revoked - Should we continue to try and certifiy Squeak?

Thu Jul 20 18:10:54 UTC 2006

Matt,

Thank you for your reply.  I've been reviewing the common criteria already,
but wasn't aware of it's applicability to waivers.  As for the Suite B, I'm
currently working on a Squeak SSL implementation.  I'm starting with TLS 1.2
specifically because it uses AES.  My goal in writing the TLS implementation
is to get a better feeling for the components, signatures, PKI, encryption,
hashing and how they work together.  I've been studying the ECC and have
come to the conclusion that it is necessary for anything that my company
writes.

I'm not sure how much difficulty I will have with TLS 1.2, but so far it
appears that we have the components necessary already and the work is moving
along nicely.  

As for the FIPS certification are you suggesting we continue to pursue it,
or instead focus on Suite B, and the common criteria?  Should we do both or
one at a time in a stepwise fashion?

Thanks again for your response.

Ron Teitelbaum

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Matthew S. Hamrick [mailto:mhamrick at cryptonomicon.net]
> Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2006 1:15 PM
> To: Ron at USMedRec.com; Cryptography Team Development List
> Cc: 'Andreas Raab'
> Subject: Re: [Cryptography Team] OpenSSL FIPS Revoked - Should we continue
> to try and certifiy Squeak?
> 
> Hi Ron,
> 
> Sorry for not responding to this earlier, it's been a pretty busy
> month for me and I'm just now getting around to catching up on email
> traffic.
> 
> I think I'm in a pretty good position to comment on this subject,
> having worked for the Department of Homeland Security, managing part
> of their PKI integration process. Somewhere along the line someone
> also put my name down as a "Federal Smartcard Program Manager." I
> don't know what that means, but I did do some work with Smart Cards
> and when I mention it to some people they seem to take it relatively
> seriously.
> 
> FIPS-140-2 is certainly important in the federal government. Laws
> exist that mandate it's use for certain federal projects. However...
> it's possible to get waivers for those laws. But FIPS-140-2 isn't the
> only certification regieme that applications and environments must
> adhere to. The Common Criteria are increasingly important as are
> adherence to the FIPS 800 series documents (though the latter are not
> certification processes in the commonly accepted sense.) Common
> Criteria covers much more than just crypto and there are Common
> Criteria for several aspects of system operation.
> 
> I think what I'm getting at here is, if you're trying to get a Squeak
> application approved for use in the US or Canadian federal
> governments, FIPS is important, but if the application is compelling
> a waiver can be received. Common Criteria may be more important to
> the program manager, but that covers way more than just the Crypto.
> So you would probably have to have your whole VM, Image and Crypto
> change-set evaluated.
> 
> And... if you're going to work on a particular standard, why not work
> on Suite B? The NSA has been recommending the use of AES and ECC for
> several months now, and I believe that if you buy into Suite-B, it
> may be easier to get a FIPS-140 waiver.
> 
> -Cheers
> -Matt H.
> 
> On Jul 20, 2006, at 9:50 AM, Ron Teitelbaum wrote:
> 
> > All,
> >
> > The only response I received about our proposal to try to get
> > certified was
> > from Andreas who said he'd send it off to the Croquet board.  After
> > reading
> > this article I really believe that we should try to get certified,
> > if for no
> > other reason then to help the open source community in general.
> >
> > Is there still an interest in this group to go through this
> > process?  If so
> > I will undertake the process of screening all certified labs to
> > find the
> > strongest lab that understands the difficulty and intricacies of open
> > source.
> >
> > Please respond back and let me know your support for the project
> > and your
> > willingness to participate, or any other comments.
> >
> > I really think the process will be very beneficial and the
> > challenge you
> > have to admit is a good one.
> >
> > Thanks!
> >
> > -Ron Teitelbaum
> >
> >
> > Security validation of OpenSSL encryption tool uncertain
> > Jaikumar Vijayan
> >
> >
> > July 19, 2006 (Computerworld) A joint U.S. and Canadian
> > organization that
> > certifies encryption tools for use by federal government agencies has
> > suspended its validation of OpenSSL cryptographic technology for
> > the second
> > time in less than six months.
> >
> > The decision means that government agencies can't purchase the open-
> > source
> > tool for the time being, although those that have already done so
> > will still
> > be allowed to use it. OpenSSL is an open-source implementation of
> > the Secure
> > Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer security protocols. It is
> > widely
> > used to encrypt and decrypt data on the Internet.
> >
> > The decision to suspend validation of the tool came just two days
> > after the
> > group doing the validation, the Cryptographic Module Validation
> > Program
> > (CMVP) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology
> > (NIST), had
> > taken the harsher step of revoking the tool entirely. It backed
> > away from
> > that decision and opted for a suspension of the process instead.
> >
> > News of the rapid changes to the validation effort drew criticism
> > from the
> > Hattiesburg, Miss.-based Open Source Software Institute (OSSI), a
> > nonprofit
> > group trying to get the OpenSSL encryption module validated for use in
> > government. John Weathersby, OSSI's executive director, today
> > alleged that
> > the move appears to have been influenced by vendors of proprietary
> > technologies that stand to lose a lucrative market if an open-source
> > alternative is certified.
> >
> > "There are some vendors fighting like hell to make this die, and I
> > can see
> > why," said Weathersby. "What's going on is the question of the day.
> > This is
> > not a technology issue; this is a political issue."
> > OpenSSL is supported on several major operating systems, including
> > many
> > flavors of Unix, Apple Computer Inc.'s Mac OS X and Microsoft Corp.'s
> > Windows.
> >
> > OpenSSL received its precedent-setting validation in January from
> > the CMVP,
> > which is charged with validating and certifying that cryptographic
> > tools
> > sold to government agencies meet the requirements of the Federal
> > Information
> > Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2. The CMVP was
> > established by
> > NIST in the U.S. and the Communications Security Establishment of the
> > Canadian government.
> >
> > A validated OpenSSL tool would allow vendors of operating systems, Web
> > browsers and other software products such as e-mail to include a
> > free FIPS
> > 140-compliant cryptographic module. The OpenSSL FIPS 140-2
> > validation effort
> > is sponsored by the Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support (DMLSS)
> > program, which provides medical logistics support to the U.S.
> > Department of
> > Defense.
> >
> > Currently, agencies looking for encryption capabilities spend
> > hundreds of
> > thousands of dollars -- and in some cases, millions of dollars --
> > licensing
> > proprietary cryptographic tools that are certified according to
> > FIPS 140.
> > Since January, however, the validation for Open SSL has been
> > revoked and
> > reinstated twice, Weathersby said. The first revocation happened in
> > January,
> > barely four days after OpenSSL was first validated by CMVP. It was
> > awarded a
> > FIPS 140-2 validation again in March after some changes were made
> > to the
> > module.
> >
> > On Friday, OSSI was told that the validation had again been revoked,
> > Weathersby said. That changed yesterday, when the organization
> > learned that
> > the OpenSSL certificate had been incorrectly "revoked" and is now
> > instead
> > "not available," he said. That means that the OpenSSL cryptographic
> > module
> > can no longer be bought by government agencies, although it can be
> > used by
> > those that already have it.
> >
> > NIST, in an e-mailed statement, confirmed the "not-available"
> > status but
> > offered no reasons for it. "However, if noncompliance is discovered
> > in a
> > module after it has been validated, and based on a risk assessment
> > it is
> > deemed to be critical, the CMVP will advise all federal agencies to
> > cease
> > using the affected module," NIST said.
> >
> > A representative for Domus IT Security Laboratory, the Ottawa-based
> > company
> > that is evaluating products for FIPS 140 compliance, referred all
> > questions
> > to the CMVP.
> >
> > The continuing uncertainly about the status of OpenSSL is sure to
> > prolong
> > what has been a multiyear effort to certify the tool. Much of the
> > delay
> > resulted from a continuing series of tweaks OSSI was required to
> > make to the
> > cryptographic module at the request of the CMVP, said Steve Marquess,
> > validation project manager at OSSI.
> >
> > Part of the problem stems from the fact that the FIPS requirements
> > were
> > written for hardware-based encryption tools while OpenSSL is
> > software-based.
> > As a result, mapping FIPS' requirements to OpenSSL has been
> > challenging,
> > Marquess said.
> >
> > Vendors of commercial products have also raised a constant stream of
> > technology-related questions that have proved time-consuming to
> > address.
> > "There have been some commercial interests who are unhappy with
> > open-source
> > validation like this," Marquess said. "One of them has been working
> > for
> > several years to challenge multiple aspects of what we are trying
> > to do," he
> > said without naming the vendor.
> >
> > One of the results is that the requirements for OpenSSL to get FIPS
> > 140-2
> > validation has keeps changing, he said. "One of our frustrations
> > through
> > this whole ordeal is pinning down the requirements in concrete
> > technical
> > terms," he said. "The requirements keep changing on us all the time."
> > George Adams, the president and CEO of SSH Communications Security
> > Inc., a
> > Wellesley, Mass.-based vendor of encryption products, said that
> > concerns
> > about the use of OpenSSL in government environments are valid. As an
> > open-source tool, OpenSSL is subject to constant changes that would
> > invalidate its certification on a regular basis, he said.
> >
> > For instance, any changes made to the source or linked library in the
> > cryptographic module will create a nonvalidated module, he said.
> > Similarly,
> > any additional cryptography outside of the validated module would
> > need to be
> > tested and validated.
> >
> > Marquess dismissed such concerns. He said that the security policy
> > associated with OpenSSL guarantees that the source code used to
> > generate the
> > cryptographic module is unmodified at all times.
> >
> >
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